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Quasi-Real Indexing 







In a pure-exchange economy with one good, stochastic aggregate demand and supply, and 
consumers having the same relative-risk aversion, Pareto efficiency requires each individual’s 
consumption to be proportional to aggregate supply.  While neither nominal contracts nor pure 
inflation-indexed contracts provide this proportionality, quasi-real contracts do.  Quasi-real 
contracts adjust for aggregate-demand-caused inflation but not for aggregate-supply-caused 
inflation, causing their real obligations to be proportional to aggregate supply.  When consumers 
differ in their relative risk aversion, or experience stochastic utility or endowment shocks, they 
will need insurance and other risk-transfer contracts in addition to quasi-real contracts. 
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Quasi-Real Indexing 
The Pareto-Efficient Solution to Inflation Indexing 
 
1. Introduction 
Like many of you, we are travelers to other universes.   We leave our chaotic and 
complex universe to travel to simpler and more comprehendible universes with hopes of learning 
lessons that apply to our own universe.  We have traveled to the well-known universe with 
certainty and perfectly competitive markets.  We have marveled at how orderly is this universe; 
how this universe follows the first and second fundamental theorems of welfare economics.  We 
have also traveled to the universe discovered by Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959) where all 
markets are perfectly competitive, uncertainty does exist, but so do state-contingent securities.  
As in the previous universe, order exists, markets are complete, and the first and second 
fundamental theorems of welfare economics apply. 
We have tried to travel to universes where markets are incomplete in an environment of 
uncertainty.  These universes are less orderly than the two previously mentioned universes, and 
they do not necessarily follow the first and second fundamental theorems of welfare economics.  
We have also traveled to universes where money exists, only to find them either unsatisfactorily 
structured or too complex to easily understand what we need or want to learn to apply to our own 
universe.  However, recently we have traveled to a universe where the “essence of money” 
permeates the economy even though no one holds money from one period to the next and where 
order prevails even without state-contingent securities.  In this universe, they have tried nominal 
contracts, which they have since discarded.  They have also tried contracts that were indexed to 
inflation, which they later also discarded.  Now they use quasi-real contracts as discussed by - 2 - 
Eagle and Domian (1995), and they are as happy as they can be; no one can be made better off 
without making someone else worse off.  We have learned lessons from our journey that apply to 
our own universe.  The quasi-real indexing of that universe could be applied to our bonds, 
wages, and social security as well as many other contracts. 
We invite you to join us in a journey back to this “essence-of-money” (EOM) universe.  
That journey will be a lot easier than most journeys to universes with incomplete markets or to 
universes where money exists.  In fact, the journey will be almost as easy as traveling to an 
Arrow-Debreu (A-D) universe.   Because of the close similarities of the EOM and A-D 
universes, we will first stop (in section 2) at an A-D universe that has a pure-exchange 
competitive equilibrium economy and where consumers have identical, constant-relative-risk-
aversion (CRRA) utility functions.  There we will learn about a characteristic of Pareto-efficient 
consumption allocations in that universe that many of us may not have previously noticed.  In 
section 3, we will complete our journey to the EOM universe.  We will study the history of 
contracts in that universe beginning with prepaid future contracts, then nominal contracts and 
inflation-indexed contracts, and then ending with their now Pareto-efficient quasi-real contracts.  
In section 4, we will graphically study how changes in nominal aggregate demand and in real 
aggregate supply affect the real payments on these contracts. 
During our return trip, we will stop in section 5 at a slightly different A-D universe.  
While consumers in the universes of sections 2 and 3 have identical, CRRA utility functions, the 
consumers in section 5’s universe have different utility functions with differing coefficients of 
relative risk aversion.  From this universe we will learn when quasi-real contracts will not be 
perfectly efficient, but you still may leave that universe with great respect for that type of 
indexing. - 3 - 
After our journey is complete, we will sit back in section 6 and contemplate the lessons 
we have learned and ponder how quasi-real indexing could be applied within our own universe 
to bonds, wage contracts, and social security.   We will also reminisce about our journey and 
contemplate undertaking other journeys to similar universes.  The appendixes contain some 
mathematical development of some tools to make our trans-universe journey easier and more 
enjoyable.  Enjoy your trip! 
 
2. A Layover in the Complete-Markets Universe 
  Don’t worry about buckling your seat belts; our means of transport is a safe one – our 
imaginations.  We first have a brief stop in a simple A-D universe.  Imagine this universe with its 
pure exchange, perfectly competitive economy with one consumption good.  This universe 
consists of an infinite series of nonoverlapping generations.
1  Every consumer of any particular 
generation lives the same T+1 periods, although different generations can have different lives.  
Our indexing of time will refer to the time of life in any particular generation.  For example, time 
t=0 represents the first period of life for a particular generation.  The consumers receive 
endowments that differ among consumers and among periods.  Within a generation, all 
consumers have the same identical, additively separable, constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) 
utility function, although relative risk aversion can vary among the generations.  For each state i 
and time t combination, a state-contingent security (also called an Arrow-Debreu security) exists 
at time 0.  The buyer of the security pays the price Wit to the seller at time 0.  The seller of the 
                                                 
1 We imagined no overlapping of generations to preclude any possible Pareto improvement from implementing a 
pay-as-you-go social security system, which would detract from the main points of this paper.   Also, while the 
general logic we present could have just applied to one generation, we imagined a series of generations so that there 
could be a past, present, and future both for generations and for markets. - 4 - 
security agrees to deliver one unit of the consumption good to the buyer of the security if and 
only if state i occurs in period t. 
Let pit be the probability of state i occurring at time t, nt be the number of states of nature 
possible at time t, and b  is the common time discount factor.
2   Each consumer’s optimization 
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for all i and t where cjit, and yjit, respectively represent consumer j’s consumption and 
endowment for state i at time t.  The variable xjit represents j’s demand at time 0 for the state-
contingent security that pays in state i at time t.  (A negative value for  jit x  indicates j is selling 
the security.) 
For any particular generation in this universe, each consumer’s utility takes the CRRA 







when g  in (0, ¥) but not equal to one, or when g equals one 
U(c)=ln(c) where ln is the natural logarithm.  The parameter g  is the constant coefficient of 
relative risk aversion. Some necessary conditions for consumer j’s optimization problem to be 
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2 The states of nature at time t can be nodes in a “tree” of states that could expand over time. - 5 - 



















where Y0 is aggregate supply at time 0 and Yit is aggregate supply at time t 








0 =   ( 2)   
Since cj0 and Y0 are known at time 0, (2) implies cjit is proportional to Yit.  For example, 
if aggregate supply drops by 10%, then all individuals reduce their consumption by 10%.  Since 
the equilibrium in an A-D economy is Pareto efficient, (2) is a necessary condition for Pareto 
efficiency in this A-D universe. 
Having learned about the proportionality between any Pareto-efficient consumption 
allocation
3 and aggregate supply when all consumers have identical CRRA utility functions, we 
are now ready to leave this A-D universe to complete our journey to the EOM universe. 
 
3.   The “Essence-of-Money” (EOM) Universe 
  To transport yourself to the EOM Universe, imagine the same as the A-D universe we 
just visited except for three changes:  First, there are no state-contingent securities.  Second, each 
consumer’s endowment is proportional to real aggregate supply in each period, meaning that that 
proportion (kjt) does not depend on the level of real aggregate supply.
4   Third, no money is held 
from one period to the next, but there is an exogenous stochastic nominal aggregate demand. 
                                                 
3 There is not just one Pareto-efficient consumption allocation, but a continuum of such allocations with each 
allocation corresponding to a given level of endowments for each state.  However, (2) applies to all of these Pareto-
efficient allocations. 
4 In a pure exchange competitive equilibrium economy, the uncertainty can only manifest itself into the endowments 
or nominal aggregate demand since all other variables are endogenous.  The assumption that endowments are 
proportional to aggregate supply means only aggregate supply and nominal aggregate demand are uncertain. - 6 - 
We asked one of the local consumers how there could be nominal aggregate demand 
without money being held from one period to the next.  She told us that every period they wake 
up to see their new individual endowments of type-M goods and a collective endowment of type-
C goods.  Both type-M and type-C goods perish within the period and are infinitely divisible.  
Only type-C goods enter the consumers’ utility functions.  As a result, the residents of this 
universe use the term “consumption good” to refer to the type-C goods.  The rule the inhabitants 
have always followed and plan to continue to always follow is that each consumer is allotted 
consumption goods based on his/her relative endowment of type-M goods. 
Define mjit to be the type-M good endowed unto consumer j in state i at time t and Mit to 
be the aggregate of the type-M good at time t (i.e., ￿ º
j






 of the consumption good in state i at time t.  For example, assume the total of the 
type-M and type-C goods over all consumers for a particular period are 1000 units and 20,000 
units respectively.  If consumer j is endowed with 2.4 units of type-M goods, then consumer j 






= , a constant, which means that  jt k  does not vary across states i=1..nt. 
The local consumers refer to the type-M goods as “money.”  Like our fiat money, their 
money has no intrinsic value; rather its value derives from the fact that it is used to obtain the 
consumption good.  Unlike our money, their money perishes after one period, and consumers are 
unable to hold it from one period to another.  Since they use their money once and then it 
disappears, we call their money “temporary money.” - 7 - 
The history of this universe tells of a time when everyone just consumed their 
endowments, no more or no less.  They quickly learned that they could make everyone better off 
by entering into contracts, but consumers in this universe only have the mental capacity to 
understand one type of contract existing.  They, therefore, are unable to create enough state-
contingent securities to complete their markets. 
The first type of contract they tried was what they called an “F contract”.  This F contract 
is similar to many futures contracts in our own universe, except the payment for the contract is 
made in the period the contract is written.  The F contract is essentially a prepaid futures contract 
just as in our own universe there are prepaid forward contracts (See McDonald, 2003, pp. 199-
120).  At time 0, there will be a total of T contracts outstanding, one each for times 1, 2, …, T.  
Under an F contract written at time 0 for time t, the buyer pays the seller the price of the contract 
in terms of the consumption good at time 0. In return, the seller agrees to pay the buyer one unit 
of the consumption good at time t. 
The existence of this contract did help improve welfare.  A consumer who had no 
endowment one period used an F contract to in essence “borrow” some consumption good in that 
period in exchange for giving up some of the consumption good in a later period.  Similarly, a 
consumer who had some endowment in the earlier period but who expected no endowment in the 
later period was able to “lend” some consumption good in the earlier period in exchange for 
receiving some of the consumption good in the later period.  Both the borrower and the lender 
were made better off by the F contract. 
However, the F contract was not Pareto efficient.  Remember that these consumers have 
the same utility functions as do the consumers in the A-D universe we just visited.  Therefore, a 
necessary condition for Pareto efficiency is that each individual’s consumption be proportional to - 8 - 
the aggregate supply for that period.  As explained earlier, the ratio of individual j’s endowment 
of the consumption good to aggregate supply at time t was kjt,.  Therefore, if the consumer j did 
not rebalance his/her holdings of unexpired F contracts, his/her consumption would have equaled 
jt it jt jit F Y k c + =  where  jt F is j’s demand at time 0 for the F contract that delivers at time t.  











+ = , which clearly shows that j’s consumption is not 
proportional to aggregate supply.
5 
In the EOM universe when only F contracts existed, the buyer of the F contract was 
entitled to one unit of the consumption good at time t regardless of aggregate supply.   If 
aggregate supply was lower than expected, the seller of the F contract was still obligated to pay 
the one consumption unit to the buyer.  To do so the seller had to reduce his/her consumption 
more than proportionately to the lower aggregate supply.  Thus, the buyer consumed more, and 
the seller consumed less than required by Pareto-efficiency.  
On the other hand, if aggregate supply was higher than expected, the seller of the F 
contract consumed more and the buyer consumed less than required by Pareto-efficiency.  In 
essence, the seller was insuring the buyer against aggregate supply decreasing.  However, given 
that both the buyer and seller had the same coefficients of relative risk aversion, the buyer really 
did not want to buy nor did the seller want to sell this insurance.  That this unwanted insurance 
was part of the F contract was what caused the consumers in the EOM universe to abandon it. 
To remove this insurance, the consumers devised the “B contract” to replace the F 
contract.  The B contract was the same as the F contract except the contract was in terms of 
                                                 
5 This represents the consumption in the last period of the generation’s life when consumers would have had no 
other contracts.  However, earlier in life, a consumer would have been able to buy or sell unexpired F contracts to 
help spread the impact of any unexpected change in aggregate supply to consumption over the rest of one’s life.  The - 9 - 
money (the type-M good) instead of the consumption good.  For a B contract written at time 0 
for delivery at time t, the buyer at time 0 paid the seller the price of the contract in terms of 
money.  The seller then used the money to obtain more consumption good at time 0.   In return, 
the seller agreed to pay one unit of money to the buyer at time t.  At time t, the buyer then used 
the money to obtain more consumption good. 
We met with a local consumer who described the sequence of events that occurred each 
period when they used the B contract.  First, they woke up to their individual money 
endowments and the collectively received endowment of the consumption good.  All consumers 
then knew the aggregate money supply and the aggregate supply of the consumption good.  
Second, the consumers entered into the B contracts.  Third, the consumers exchanged money to 
meet their B-contract obligations for both the expiring contracts and the contracts they entered 
into this period.  Finally, the consumers presented their money to determine their allotment that 
period of the consumption good. 
Initially when consumers used the B contract, the aggregate money supply was constant 
from period to period.  During this time, the B contract worked very well.  In fact, the B contract 
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ability to rebalance indicates a sequential economy, that markets are open not only at time 0 but later periods as 
well.  The need to rebalance is itself an indication of the Pareto inefficiency of the market. - 10 - 
Since kjt and Bjt were both constant at time t, cjit was proportional to Yit regardless of 
state i as long as the aggregate money supply did not change with state i.  When the aggregate 
money supply was constant, the B contract enabled consumers to in essence “borrow” or “lend” 
money to achieve the same Pareto-efficient allocations as they would have had in the A-D 
universe.  The purchasing power of one B contract equaled aggregate supply over the aggregate 
money supply.  Therefore, when the money supply was constant, the purchasing power of a B 
contract increased or decreased proportionately to changes in aggregate supply. 
It amazed us to learn that the B contract by itself was able to do the same as a large 
number of state-contingent securities.  The nominal nature of the B contract resulted in the 
purchasing power of the contract changing when aggregate supply changed just exactly as 
needed for the welfare of the EOM universe. 
Just when the consumers in this universe started to think they were as well off as they 
could be, the aggregate money supply began changing.  In some periods, it rose unexpectedly; in 
others it unexpectedly decreased.  This caused the purchasing power of a B contract to change 
for reasons other than changes in aggregate supply of the consumption good.  As seen in 
equation (3), an unexpected increase in the money supply caused the buyer of a B contract at 
time 0 to consume less than planned in period t and the seller to consume more than planned.  On 
the other hand, an unexpected decrease in the money supply caused the buyer to consume more 
and the seller to consume less than planned.  Since these consumers were risk averse, they 
disliked this increased uncertainty concerning their consumption.
6 
To try to learn how to improve the B contract, the EOM universe sent some researchers 
to our universe to learn from us.   While most of our universe was too confusing for the visitors 
                                                 
6 As with the F contract, rebalancing one’s portfolio could have helped spread the impact of these unexpected money 
supply changes over the remainder of one’s life rather than the consumer absorbing the whole impact in one period. - 11 - 
to understand, they did find our economic literature more comprehendible.  From this literature, 
they learned about inflation-indexing and upon returning to the EOM universe, they designed the 
“R contract”.   They first defined the price level as  it it it Y M P º .
7   For an R contract written at 
time 0 for time t, the buyer paid the seller the price of the contract at time 0 in terms of money.  
In return, the seller promised to pay the buyer at time t money equal to the ratio  0 P P it . 
After trying the R contract out, the EOM universe found they had just completed a circle 
– they were back to having the equivalent of their F contract.  Regardless what happened to 
aggregate supply in time t, the seller of an R contract was guaranteeing the buyer a specific 
amount of the consumption good. 
The EOM universe sent their researchers back to our universe to scour our economic 
literature for some guidance.   Finally, they found quasi-real indexing (Eagle and Domian, 1995), 
which only adjusts for inflation caused by aggregate-demand shocks and not for inflation caused 
by aggregate-supply shocks.  The researchers returned to the EOM universe and designed a new 
contract which they called a “Q contract”. 
In a Q contract written at time 0 for time t, the seller promises to pay the buyer money 
equal to the ratio of the money supply at time t over the money supply at time 0.
8  Where  jt Q  is 
consumer j’s demand at time 0 for the Q contract for delivery at time t, j’s consumption in state i 























0 .  Remembering that kjt = mjit/Mit, the above simplifies to: 
                                                 
7 In the EOM universe, velocity always equals one because money is used only once before it perishes. 
8 Eagle and Domian (1995) present quasi-real indexing using the ratio of nominal GDP to the base year’s nominal 















Because kjt, Qjt and M0 are known at time 0, individual j’s consumption at time t will be 
proportional to aggregate supply regardless of the level of aggregate supply or the money supply. 
As shown in the appendix, the Q contract has in fact resulted in Pareto efficiency being 
achieved in the EOM universe.
9 
 
4. A Graphical Understanding of the F, B, R, and Q Contracts 
Before we leave the EOM universe, we will use graphs to help us better understand the 
differences amount these contracts.  Figures 1 and 2 show how the real payments on these 
contracts vary ceteris paribus with respectively nominal aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply.  Each curve is identified by combinations of the letters F, B, R, and Q to denote the 
contracts that apply to the curve. 
The F contract was very much like our commodity futures contract except the buyer of an 
F contract paid the seller when the contract was written instead of at the delivery date.  
Essentially, the F contract was a bond where payments were made in terms of the consumption 
good both when the contract was written and at delivery.  As shown in Figure 1, the real payment 
at expiration of the F contract was immune to changes in nominal aggregate demand. 
The real payment on an F contract also was immune to changes in aggregate supply as 
shown in Figure 2.    The seller guaranteed one consumption good regardless of aggregate 
supply.  However, to meet that guarantee, the lender had to decrease his/her consumption more 
than proportionately to any decrease in aggregate supply.  (On the other hand, if aggregate - 13 - 
supply increased, the lender kept 
all the increase.)  Since Pareto 
efficiency requires consumers with 
identical CRRA utility to 
proportionately reduce (increase) 
their own consumption with 
decreases (increases) in aggregate 
supply, this immunity of the real 
payment of the F contract to 
changes in aggregate supply 
caused the EOM universe to 
discard it. 
The second contract the EOM universe tried was the B contract where the seller delivered 
one unit of money to the buyer at time t in exchange for the buyer paying the seller the contract’s 
price at time 0.  This B contract was equivalent to one of our nominal discount bonds or zero-
coupon bonds.  As shown in Figure 2, when nominal aggregate demand remains the same, the 
real payment on the nominal bond at time t varied proportionately with aggregate supply, 
enabling consumers to achieve a Pareto-efficient consumption allocation.  For example, if 
aggregate supply decreased by 10%, the price level would rise by 10% causing the real payment 
on the nominal bond to decrease by 10%. 
However, the downfall of these nominal bonds was in how they varied with nominal 
aggregate demand.  As shown in Figure 1, when aggregate supply remained the same, the real 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Because the Q contract is Pareto efficient, markets need only be open at time 0 of each generation;  Even if 







Figure 1: Real Payments on Contracts F, B, R, and Q 
as Functions of Nominal Aggregate Demand - 14 - 
payment on the bond decreased with nominal aggregate demand. When nominal aggregate 
demand exceeded its expected value (Ne), the price level unexpectedly increased, causing the 
real payment on the bond to decrease.  This lower real payment made the borrower better off 
(i.e., higher real consumption) and the lender worse off.  On the other hand, if nominal aggregate 
demand was less than expected, the real payment on the bonds increased, causing the borrower 
to be worse off and the lender better off.  Since they are risk averse, both borrowers and lenders 
prefer a certain real payment over the uncertain real payments on B contracts caused by changes 
in nominal aggregate demand. 
The next contract the EOM universe tried was the R contract, which was the equivalent 
of an inflation-indexed discount bond, which we sometimes refer to as a “real” bond.  However, 
this real bond turned out to be essentially the same as the F contract.  As shown in Figures 1 
and 2, changes in neither nominal aggregate demand nor aggregate supply affected the real 
payment on a real bond.  As with 
the F contract, the real bond failed 
to enable consumers to reach 
Pareto-efficient consumption 
allocations because the lender of a 
real bond guaranteed the real 
payment to the borrower even 
when aggregate supply changed. 
The contract the EOM 
universe now uses is the Q 






Figure 2: Real Payments of Contracts F, B, R, and 
Q as Functions of Aggregate Supply - 15 - 
bond indexed for aggregate-demand-caused inflation or deflation but not for aggregate-supply-
caused inflation or deflation.  We will call this bond a “quasi-real bond” as did Eagle and 
Domian (1995).  The real payment on a quasi-real bond is immune to changes in nominal 
aggregate demand as shown in Figure 1.  On the other hand, the real payment on a quasi-real 
bond changes proportionately to changes in aggregate supply just as with a nominal bond (see 
Figure 2).  Having real payments that are immune to changes in nominal aggregate demand, but 
proportional to aggregate supply is exactly what is needed to make the quasi-real bonds Pareto 
efficient when all consumers have identical CRRA utility functions. 
In summary, Figures 1 and 2 show the following bond properties which do not depend on 
any utility assumptions: 
1.  The real payments on nominal bonds decrease with increases in nominal aggregate 
demand and increase proportionately with increases in aggregate supply. 
2.  The real payments on inflation-indexed bonds are immune to changes both in nominal 
aggregate demand and in aggregate supply. 
3.  The real payments on quasi-real bonds are immune to changes in nominal aggregate 
demand but increase proportionately with increases in aggregate supply. 
 
5. A Layover in Another A-D Universe Without CRRA Utility 
Having learned that in the EOM universe, problems existed with both nominal and 
inflation-indexed bonds, but that quasi-real bonds are Pareto efficient, we are now ready to leave 
this universe.  As we leave, we wonder if the lessons we have learned here are applicable to our 
own universe.  We wonder whether the Pareto efficiency of quasi-real bonds will persist beyond 
an economy with consumers having identical CRRA utility functions.  We ponder whether quasi-- 16 - 
real bonds in our universe will be able to duplicate the consumer allocation that would result 
from an economy with complete markets of state-contingent securities.  To help answer that 
question, we now stop at a different A-D universe on our return trip and learn more about how a 
Pareto-efficient consumption allocation changes with aggregate supply when consumers differ in 
their risk aversion. 
Imagine the A-D universe of section 2 with one change — consumers in this A-D 
universe have different utility functions.  These utility functions are still all well behaved, i.e., 
they are risk averse, continuous, twice differentiable, and  -¥ =
® ) ( lim
0 c U
c .
10  In this universe, 
bonds are not needed since state-contingent securities provide complete markets.  However, this 
universe could help us think about how nominal, inflation-indexed, and quasi-real bonds would 
meet consumers’ needs if these state-contingent securities did not exist. 
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where b is the time discount factor in common to all consumers. Since different consumers can 
have different utility functions at different times, the common time discount factor is not really a 
restrictive assumption.
11 
                                                 
10 The latter assumption means that the utility function is unbounded from below as is the CRRA utility function.  If 
we were dealing with continuous probability distribution functions, this would create a problem (see Arrow, 1965).  
However, throughout this paper, we assume discrete distributions.  Nevertheless, some may criticize us including 
this latter assumption in the term “well behaved”.  We did so in order to preclude a corner solution for consumption 
in any period equaling zero. 
11 Suppose for complete generality the discount factor varies by consumer, by state, and by time; that instead of 
) ( jit jt
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denotes the true utility function.  If we set our beta 
equal to one and defined  ) (
~
) ( jit jt
t
jit jit jt c U c U b º , our formulation would take this situation into account.  We 
chose to leave a constant time preference factor in our formulation to make it consistent with our including a time 
preference factor for the EOM universe. - 17 - 
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A necessary condition for this optimization problem to be satisfied for all consumers is 
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Since j’s Pareto-efficient consumption is a function solely of aggregate supply,
12 define 
the implicit function  ) ( ~
t jt Y c  to be how the Pareto-Efficient consumption by individual j at time t 
depends on aggregate supply.
13  It is extremely important to recognize  ) ( ~
t jt Y c as a reduced form; 
it is not the structural consumption function.  To help us avoid this confusion, we will refer to Yt 
as aggregate supply at time t, not income. 
Define  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) t jt jt
t jt jt







- º  , which is the function of how the coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion varies with aggregate supply.  Define  ( ) ( ) ( ) t jt t jt t jt Y a Y c Y ~ ~ ~ × º r , which is the 
function of how the relative risk coefficient varies with aggregate supply.  Also, define 
                                                 
12 To see that j’s Pareto-efficient consumption allocation is solely a function of aggregate supply, let state 1 and 
state 2 be any two states where aggregate supply are the same.  State 2 could still differ from state 1 because of a 
different distribution of endowments or different probabilities.  Set  t t t t 1 2 1 2 p p W = W .  If  t j t j c c 1 2 =  for all j, 
then if (5) holds for all j when i=1 then it also holds for all j when i=2 .  Also, if  t j t j c c 1 2 =  for all j, then if markets 
clear for state 1 then they clear for state 2.  Therefore, if  jt c ~ for j=1..m is the optimal consumption for one state, it is 
also the optimal consumption for another state with the same level of aggregate supply.  Therefore, the competitive-
equilibrium consumption allocation in an Arrow-Debreu economy is a function solely of aggregate supply. 
13 There is not just one Pareto-efficient consumption allocation, but rather a continuum of such allocations, each 
corresponding to a particular allocation of endowments across states.  We can think about this Pareto-efficient 
consumption allocation as the one that corresponds to the existing allocation of endowments. - 18 - 
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the derivatives of  ) ( ~
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~ º , which is how j’s 
relative risk coefficient compares to the average relative risk coefficient. 
For the general Arrow-Debreu pure-exchange economy, the appendix derives the 
following relationship: 












= ¢   (6) 
If aggregate supply decreases by 1%, then (6) says that the Pareto-efficient consumption will 
decrease by half a percent for someone who has twice the average relative risk aversion, whereas 
it will decrease by 2% for someone having half the average relative risk aversion.  By decreasing 
their consumption more than proportionately, the lower (relatively) risk-averse consumers are 
enabling the higher risk-averse consumers to reduce their consumption less than proportionately.  
In essence, the lower risk-averse consumers are providing insurance to the higher risk-averse 
consumers.
14 
This result will help answer some questions concerning the extent to which quasi-real 
bonds can help enable consumers to reach their Pareto-efficient consumption allocations when 
consumers differ in their relative risk aversion.  However, it is time to return home from our 
journey. 
 
                                                 
14 The relationship in (6) is related to one derived by Viard (1993), although he assumed that all income was derived 
from past investments in risky assets whereas we assume all income comes from endowments. - 19 - 
6. Journey Reflections 
Now let’s open our eyes, be realistic, and return to our own universe.   We see that 
money in our universe does not perish; we can hold it from one period to the next.  We see many 
inflation-indexed contracts.  We see governments issuing inflation-indexed bonds such as TIPS 
by the U.S. and inflation-linked gilts by the U.K.   Governments index social security for 
inflation.  Both governmental and business organizations often index pension funds and wages 
for inflation.  
We do not, however, see quasi-real indexing in our universe.  Quasi-real bonds with no 
other contracts enabled the EOM universe to achieve Pareto efficiency.  Can quasi-real indexing 
help us improve economic efficiency? 
Both risk-averse borrowers and risk-averse lenders will be better off if we eliminate any 
uncertainty caused by changes in nominal aggregate demand. Since the only difference between 
quasi-real bonds and nominal bonds is how their real payments are affected by nominal 
aggregate demand, quasi-real bonds are Pareto superior to nominal bonds.  More generally, we 
conclude that quasi-real indexing is Pareto superior to no indexing for inflation.
15 
On the other hand, we cannot say that pure inflation-indexed bonds are Pareto superior to 
nominal bonds.  While pure inflation-indexed bonds do adjust for aggregate-demand-caused 
inflation (or deflation), they also destroy the proportionality of the real payments of nominal 
bonds to aggregate supply which was so valuable in the EOM universe.   Perhaps this is a reason 
that our economies have not embraced inflation indexing more than they have.  As Adolph and 
Wolstetter (1991) state, “Roughly until the mid-1970s, most economists recommended full 
indexation as a cure to deal with the ills of unanticipated inflation. … But then came the oil-price - 20 - 
shock of the early 1970s, and it became painfully clear that unanticipated inflation can be caused 
by unpredictable real as well as monetary distortions.  Subsequently indexation was looked at 
with less enthusiasm.” 
The wage indexation literature founded by the work of Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977) 
followed the oil shocks of the 1970s.  This literature recognized the difference between 
aggregate-demand-caused inflation and aggregate-supply-caused inflation.  While this literature 
did not explicitly state that aggregate-demand-caused inflation is bad and aggregate-supply-
caused inflation is good, it did conclude that (i) full inflation indexing should occur when only 
aggregate-demand shocks and no aggregate-supply shocks were possible, and (ii) no inflation 
indexing should occur if only aggregate-supply shocks and no aggregate-demand shocks were 
possible.
16  For more on this literature, see Dornbusch and Simonsen (1993), Adolph and 
Wolstetter (1991), Landerretche, Lefort, and Valdés (2002), and Heinemann (2004).  
When both aggregate-demand and aggregate-supply shocks are possible, the wage 
indexation literature concluded that partial indexing is optimal.  For example, assume that people 
expect that aggregate-demand or aggregate-supply shocks are equally likely.  Then the optimum, 
according to the wage indexation literature, is for contracts to be half indexed.  With such half 
indexing, a 10% inflation rate would contractually lead to a 5% increase in nominal wages.  This 
5% increase would result regardless whether the inflation was caused by an aggregate-demand or 
an aggregate-supply shock. 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 Some have expressed concerns that central banks may lose their incentive to keep inflation under control if there 
is inflation indexing, which equally applies to quasi-real indexing.   However, if the central bank were committed to 
nominal income targeting aimed at zero or low inflation in the long run, this would not be an issue. 
16 Gray’s (1976) and Fischer’s (1978) analyses found that full indexation reduced output fluctuations due to nominal 
shocks but increased output fluctuations due to real shocks.  Their analyses differ from our analysis because rather 
than using Pareto-efficiency as the criterion for evaluating the welfare impacts of these shocks, they followed the 
standard in macroeconomic literature, which is to assume an ad-hoc objective function that minimizes a weighted 
average of the variance of inflation from its target (or the variance of the price level from its target) and the square - 21 - 
Our journey to the EOM universe in this paper has enabled us to see the Pareto 
implications of indexing.  In the EOM universe, partial indexing would not have been Pareto 
efficient, but we saw that quasi-real indexing is Pareto efficient.  While pure inflation indexing 
cannot distinguish ex post between aggregate-demand-caused and aggregate-supply-caused 
inflation, quasi-real indexing can.  If a 10% inflation rate is solely caused by aggregate demand 
(which would show up as a 10% increase in nominal GDP), quasi-real indexing would increase 
the nominal payments on a contract by 10%.  On the other hand, if a 10% inflation rate is solely 
due to a decrease in aggregate supply (meaning that nominal GDP does not change), then quasi-
real indexing would not change the nominal contractual payments.  If inflation increases 10% 
when NGDP increases 5% (meaning inflation is equally affected by aggregate-demand and 
aggregate-supply shifts), then quasi-real indexing would increase the nominal contract payment 
by 5%. 
In the EOM universe, quasi-real indexing is Pareto efficient.  However, the EOM 
universe has several simplifying characteristics.  In the EOM universe, the variable kjt, which 
represents the ratio of j’s endowment to aggregate supply, is not stochastic meaning that kjt does 
not vary across states of nature.  Also, there are no utility shocks and all consumers have the 
same relative risk aversion in the EOM universe. 
Eagle (2004) analyzes a general pure-exchange economy.  His analysis allows stochastic 
endowment-to-real-aggregate-supply ratios, utility shocks, and differences in relative risk 
aversion among consumers.   He finds that four types of contracts can approximately complete 
markets: (1) endowment-sharing contracts, (2) spending-sharing contracts, (3) real-aggregate-
supply-risk-transfer (RASRT) contracts, and (4) “normal contracts.”  The first two types of 
                                                                                                                                                             
of output from its target or potential  (i.e. output gap).   This differs from our analysis because we emphasize Pareto 
efficiency and we assume a pure-exchange economy where output is exogenous. - 22 - 
contracts are insurance contracts that deal with the unique or unsystematic risk associated with 
individuals’ endowment-to-real-aggregate-supply ratios or their spending needs.  The RASRT 
contracts are similar to Shiller’s (1993) proposed GDP futures, which enable consumers with 
above average relative risk aversion to transfer some real-aggregate-supply risk to consumers 
having below average relative risk aversion.  Eagle defines “normal contracts” as contracts 
whose real payments are proportional to real aggregate supply.  Quasi-real contracts are normal 
contracts.  Therefore, even in a more general economy, quasi-real contracts combined with 
endowment-sharing contracts, spending-sharing contracts, and RASRT contracts do lead to 
Pareto-efficiency. 
Here on Earth, some contracts are purely inflation indexed, but none have yet to be quasi-
real indexed.  In order for pure inflation indexing to be Pareto superior to quasi-real indexing, the 
recipients of the contract’s payments would need to have much more relative risk aversion than 
those who made the payments on these contracts.  In essence with purely inflation-indexed 
contracts, there is a transfer of real-aggregate-supply risk from those receiving the payments to 
those making the payments.  We believe that with most inflation-indexed contracts those who 
will be making the payments are unaware of the risk they are exposing themselves to as a result 
of the indexing. 
For example, consider a government that issues inflation-indexed bonds and that inflation 
indexes many of its other obligations such as social security, pension funds for its workers, and 
its employees’ wages.  Suppose aggregate supply fell in half for some reason such as war, a 
terrorist attack, or a natural phenomenon like volcanic activity or a meteorite hitting the earth.  
Prices would then double if the central bank did not allow nominal aggregate demand to change.  
The government would then have to double its nominal payments on its inflation-indexed - 23 - 
obligations.  If the government neither increases its borrowing nor increases taxes (at a time 
when consumers are already struggling with less), then the government would have to cut its 
non-inflation-indexed obligations much more than proportionately in order to meet its inflation-
indexed obligations.  In fact, if half the government’s budget was inflation indexed, this 50% 
reduction in aggregate supply and doubling of the price level would force the government to 
completely eliminate all of its non-inflation-indexed spending.  Is this really what the 
government wants?  Is this really what the taxpayers/beneficiaries want?
17 
Many have criticized governments for providing insurance.  We believe that few realize 
the degree to which governments expose themselves to risk through their inflation-indexed 
obligations.  If we take the insurance out of these inflation-indexed obligations, we would then 
have quasi-real indexing. 
With pure inflation indexing, we multiply the obligation by the ratio of the current price 
level divided by the price level in the base year. Eagle and Domian (1995) propose achieving 








where Nt is nominal GDP 
in period t and g is the expected long-term growth rate in real GDP which would be stated in the 
quasi-real-indexed contract.  This setup will result with adjustments to the obligation being made 
when nominal GDP increases at a rate greater than or less than g.  Under rational expectations, 
the estimate of g is not important to the efficiency of the quasi-real bonds.  If the market has a 
                                                 
17 Some public finance literature does assume the government is risk neutral.  However, if the taxpayers and 
beneficiaries are risk averse, and since those taxpayers and/or beneficiaries would have to absorb any undiversifiable 
risk that the government exposes itself to, a government acting in a risk neutral manner would be contrary to the 
preferences of taxpayers and/or beneficiaries.  While the government may be able to diversify away some risk, one 
must only look at the corporate finance literature to realize that there is some risk (called systematic risk) that cannot 
be diversified away (See Brealey, Myers, and Marcus, 2005, p. 283). In particular, the risk related to the level of 
aggregate supply cannot be diversified away. - 24 - 
different estimate of g, the market will compensate for that difference through the quasi-real 
interest rate.  
However, other practical issues concerning quasi-real indexing do need attention.  For 
example, the timing of nominal GDP information, the lag of that information, the degree to 
which that information is subject to revision, and the reliability of that information all are 
important issues for us to consider as we try to develop quasi-real indexing for economies in our 
universe.  Also, theoretically quasi-real indexing should be based on a measure of nominal 
aggregate demand rather than nominal income.  The primary purpose of this paper is to discuss 
the theoretical desirability of quasi-real indexing; we will leave most of the issues related to the 
practical implementation of this indexing method to future research. 
Many years ago, medical experts thought all cholesterol was bad; now they talk about 
good cholesterol and bad cholesterol.  Most of the previous economic literature, with the 
exception of the wage indexation literature, has treated all inflation as bad.  However, the EOM 
universe viewed inflation as either good or bad.  We believe that the EOM universe’s good-bad 
inflation view applies as much to our own universe as to theirs.  Inflation caused by nominal 
aggregate demand shocks is bad and needs to be filtered out.  However, inflation caused by 
aggregate supply shocks is good because it helps to efficiently reallocate consumption to changes 
in aggregate supply. 
While this paper was able to generalize from identical CRRA utility to situations where 
consumers have different relative risk aversion, we did restrict our journey to universes with 
pure-exchange, closed economies.  Future researchers should attempt to travel to similar 
universes that include production and open economies. 
 - 25 - 
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This appendix first derives the relationship (6) which shows how Pareto-Efficient 
consumption is related to relative risk aversion.  Secondly, it shows that quasi-real bonds do lead 
to Pareto Efficiency in the EOM universe. 
 
Relative Risk Aversion and Pareto-Efficient Consumption 
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.  This and (A3) imply 
















  (A5)  
This result was first derived by Wilson (1968, see his theorem 5). 
Next, we need to determine the value of  ( ) t t Y r .  The following starts out with the 
definition of  ( ) t t Y r , then substitutes in the definition of  ( ) t jt Y r ~  and the result in (A5): 
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However, the sum of consumption across all consumers in this pure exchange economy 













r   (A6) - 29 - 
  Now we are ready to derive (6). From the definition of  ( )








~ º , we can 
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a = .  Dividing both sides by  jt a ~  gives us (6). 
 
Pareto Efficiency of Quasi-real Bonds in the EOM Economy 
This section of the appendix shows that, when consumers have the same identical CRRA 
utility functions, the EOM economy with quasi-real bonds is Pareto efficient, that its 
consumption allocation is the same as the Arrow-Debreu economy with complete markets. 
We will symbolize the expected value of a random variable  it X  as [ ] t X E *  where the “*” 
indicates that we are doing this expectation over all possible i=1..T. When consumers have the 
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0   (A9) 
and the quantity demanded of each Arrow-Debreu security is 
 
jit jit jit y c x - =   (A10) 
Below we briefly sketch a proof that equations (A7) through (A10) represent the Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium.  Without loss of generality, let  . 1 0 = P  
The next two lines use that 
g - = ¢ c c U ) ( , (A8), and (A9) to show that the left and right 
sides of (5) are equal, which mean that the marginal conditions of each consumer’s optimization 







































































  The constraints of the optimization problem can be reduced into the following single 
constraint: 
￿￿ ￿￿
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which shows that the left and right sides of the constraint equal each other. 
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  Summing (A10) across all consumers j gives 
0
1 1 1











jit Y Y y c x  - 32 - 
which means that the markets for the state-contingent securities clear.  Since each consumer’s 
optimization problem is satisfied and since all markets clear, (A7) through (A10) does represent 
the equilibrium to the A-D economy with identical CRRA utility. 
  The equilibrium for the EOM economy with quasi-real bonds will be the same 































0   (A12) 
  Because goods markets clear for the consumption allocations in (A7) and (A8) for the 
Arrow-Debreu economy, they clear for the EOM economy.   Remaining to prove are (i) that 
consumers’ optimization problems are satisfied, and (ii) that the market for quasi-real bonds 
clears. 
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+ =   (A14) 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for this problem to be satisfied are that the constraints 
(A13) and (A14) are met and: - 33 - 

















  (A15) 
Since consumers in the EOM universe have identical CRRA utility functions, (A15) becomes 















To show that this is satisfied, into the right side of the above we replace  0 M  with  0 0Y P ,  jit c  with 
(A8), and  t V with (A11): 





































































To show that the constraint (A13) is satisfied, into the left side of (A13) we substitute 
(A11) for  t V , (A12) for  jt Q , and eventually (A7) for  0 j c : 
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The reader also can easily show that the constraint (A14) is satisfied by replacing cjit with 
(A8),  jt Q  in (A14) with (A12) and noting that  it jt jit Y k y = . 
Because the goods market at time 0 clears, each of the markets for quasi-real bonds also 
































































  Since all markets clear and each consumer’s optimization problem is satisfied, equations 
(A7), (A8), (A11), and (A12) represent the equilibrium for the EOM economy.  Since the 
consumption allocation is the same as for the Arrow-Debreu economy with complete markets, 
the consumption allocation is Pareto efficient. 